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Abstract
The Air Force provides unique capabilities for the defense of our nation. Capabilities do
not come to fruition instantly; they must go through a development process. Managing
the development of a capability is a difficult but necessary task. In 2016, a report from
the Air Force Studies Board prompted the Air Force to focus on the Capability
Development Process and its improvement. In response to the report, the Strategic
Development Planning & Experimentation (SDPE) Office was formed. The SDPE Office
is tasked to support Enterprise Capability Collaboration Teams (ECCTs), which are, in
turn, tasked to research and solve prominent issues articulated by Air Force leadership.
To support ECCTs and the Capability Development Council, the SDPE Office must
manage capability development. This research investigates how other Military Services
and civilian service sectors handle capability development. The results from this analysis
will provide the SDPE Office recommendations for managing responsibilities, based on
the best practices found among the organizations studied.
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INVESTIGATING CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT FOR THE
AIR FORCE STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT PLANNING &
EXPERIMENTATION (SDPE) OFFICE

I. Introduction
1.1 Background
Strategic planning is difficult and time consuming, but necessary (Cohen, 2017).
A primary strategic goal of the United States Department of Defense (DoD) can be
summarized in past Deputy Secretary of Defense Work’s words as “maintain[ing] our
ability to project combat power into any area at the time and place of our own choosing”
(Work, 2016: par. 39). One way that the DoD achieves this goal, is through funding
Research and Development (R&D) and capability development (CD). Research and
Development is defined as “any technologically related activity that has the potential to
renew or extend present businesses or generate new ones, including core competency
development, innovation, invention, product development, and process improvement”
(Matheson and Matheson, 2016:1). Capability development is the complete process, from
concept to “warfighter employment” (Air Force Studies Board, 2016: 96), that a
capability goes through to be actualized, used by and relevant to the warfighter (Air
Force Studies Board, 2016: 96). It is “designed to identify opportunities and provide
solutions to mitigate risk associated with Joint warfighting capability gaps” (Department
of the Air Force, 2016:21). Although R&D and CD have differences, treating them
similarly benefits this research by allowing topics, that might have been considered
irrelevant, into the realm of applicable study.
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In the Air Force (AF), capability development stems from multiple sources. These
sources range from top level guidance with documents such as the National Security
Strategy, the Defense Innovation Initiative, and Air Force Strategic Master Plan, to
operational and tactical level guidance including warfighter needs, capability gaps, and
threats (Department of the Air Force, 2016:21-22; Department of Defense, 2014; Insinna,
2017). These various sources prompt an array of questions for the Air Force to answer
with respect to capability development. A number of these questions are: What capability
gaps exist? Which capabilities should be developed? When should a capability be
developed? What happens if a capability falls through? The Air Force must approach
capability development carefully, with all of the uncertainty and risk involved, for future
mission success.
Capabilities exist within the Core Functions of the Air Force. These 12 Core
Functions (bulleted list below) were divided among seven Air Force Major Commands
(MAJCOMs) (bold headings) as seen in Table 1.
Table 1. Air Force Core Function Assignments
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A Core Function Lead (CFL) is assigned to each Core Function in a MAJCOM
(Department of the Air Force, 2015:9). CFL-led MAJCOM Teams look within their areas
of operation to determine what capabilities already exist and whether existing capabilities
can fulfill the DoD-mandated Core Function requirements (Department of Defense,
2010:34; Department of the Air Force, 2011:43-53). Formally, a capability requirement is
“a capability required to meet an organization’s roles, functions, and missions in current
or future operations” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015b:GL-5). It “describes the ability to
accomplish a task or mission, under a specific set of conditions or constraints and to a
specified minimum standard considered effective and/or acceptable” (“AF
Requirements,” 2017:slide 9). Certain capability requirements are classified, while others
are unclassified. Sometimes, an existing MAJCOM capability leaves a projected mission
requirement unfulfilled. Still, other times, a MAJCOM simply may not have a capability
required to meet Core Function objectives. The situations described in the previous
sentences are examples of capability gaps, “the inability to meet or exceed a capability
requirement, resulting in an associated operational risk until closed or mitigated” (Joint
Chiefs of Staff, 2015b:GL-5). After a MAJCOM finds a gap, it investigates internal ways
to develop capabilities and solutions to meet the need.
At times, capability gaps are found across MAJCOMs and Core Functions (not
only for one individual Core Function or MAJCOM). To manage these multiple domain
and multiple Core Function capability gaps and solutions, the Air Force instituted the
Strategic Development Planning and Experimentation (SDPE) Office. For the last two
years, the SDPE Office has worked with Enterprise Capability Collaboration Teams
(ECCTs) through Experimentation campaigns to find and develop innovative and robust
3

capabilities to fill these capability gaps (Air Force Studies Board, 2016). For clarification,
the phrase Strategic Development Planning and Experimentation can be separated into
two parts: (1) Development Planning and (2) Experimentation. Development Planning
(DP) is “a key process to support the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the
Air Force in strategic decisions that guide the Air Force toward mission success today
and in the future, within available funds and with acceptable risk” (Air Force Studies
Board, 2014: 4). DP concentrates on “pre-acquisition” (Air Force Studies Board, 2014:i)
guidance for Air Force senior leaders in strategic decision making. On the other hand, an
experiment is “a systematic method for exploring assumptions under controlled
conditions” (Air Force Studies Board, 2016:8) and an experimentation campaign is “a set
of experiments intended to address a particular objective” (Air Force Studies Board,
2016:8). The SDPE Office manages both Development Planning and Experimentation
across the Air Force.
The Air Force is not the only branch with a capability development process; other
Military Services have processes and guidelines for developing capabilities for their
functions and missions as well. Also, in the civilian sector, many studies on Research and
Development portfolio management and capability development management have been
conducted for analysis and improvement of the pursuing organization. Capability
development is motivated by the DoD objective of ensuring that the nation is able to both
defend itself and take action when necessary. The 2016 Charter for Air Force Capability
Development articulates how capability development “includes all activities from
opportunity or capability gap identification to warfighter employment” (Air Force Studies
Board, 2016: 96). Ultimately, capability development must be monitored and managed
4

well to ensure that the best and most relevant capabilities are on time and ready for
warfighter use.
1.2 Problem
Since early 2014, there has been an increased focus to address the Capability
Development Process of the Air Force due to a National Resource Council Air Force
Studies Board report. One result of this increased focus was the recent (2016) stand up of
the Strategic Development Planning and Experimentation (SDPE) Office. The SDPE
Office is tasked to manage capability development and support ECCTs that research and
provide solutions to significant issues articulated by Air Force senior leadership. Because
of the newness of the organization and the limited time to explore external capability
development management tactics, techniques, and procedures, the SDPE Office reached
out to Academia for assistance. Thus, this research does two things: (1) investigates how
other Military Services and a few civilian service sectors handle capability development
and (2) provides the SDPE Office recommendations for managing responsibilities, based
on the best practices found among the organizations studied.
This research problem was developed and formulated through multiple interviews
with the Sponsor representative. Two interviews with the Sponsor were conducted; one in
May 2017 and the other in August 2017. These interviews made the research problem
concrete and revealed the Sponsor’s concerns. The second interview brought clarification
to the Sponsor’s needs and the thesis was promptly adjusted to adhere to them. Both
interviews were face-to-face with the student, advisor, and Sponsor representative in
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attendance. They lasted about an hour each, with questions from the student and advisor
being addressed by the Sponsor.
1.3 Justification for research
Managing the development of capabilities is difficult. What if the capability falls
through? What if an emerging technology makes the capability obsolete? What if the
capability takes longer than expected and does not get to the warfighter in time? What is
Plan B? A few examples of crucial factors an organization must consider when managing
capability development are deciding which capabilities would be best to invest in, and
deciding the best time frame to invest. Similarly, questions of which capabilities should
be shut down or modified need to be answered. The recent (2016) stand up of the
Strategic Development Planning and Experimentation Office has created a need for
researching how organizations outside of the Office, approached capability development.
This research benefits the sponsor by looking at how sister Military Services, foreign
militaries from a case study, and a few civilian sector organizations manage capability
development in order to map the best and applicable practices to the Air Force.
1.4 Scope and Assumptions
Due to the vast possible sources for investigation, the scope limits the number of
organizations studied in this research. These organizations include the Air Force, the
Army, the Navy, foreign Military Services (from a case study), and a few Civilian service
organizations. For addressing foundational understandings, we make an assumption that
the current capability development management processes studied in the literature are not
undergoing major changes due to unknown impending transformational technologies and
6

comparable uncertainties. Also, this research assumes that the mission of the SDPE
Office will not change dramatically (to where this research becomes obsolete) within the
timeframe of this research and presentation.
1.5 Approach
This research method gathers and analyzes documentation from military and
civilian publications and articles to provide a solution to the problem statement presented
in Section 1.2 of the Introduction. Articles were gathered through scholarly search
engines, such as Google Scholar, the Defense Technical Information Center, and also
through military publication search engines.
1.6 Research Questions and Objectives
The following questions provide the basis for this research:
Research Question 1:
How do other Military Services approach capability development management?
Research Question 2:
How do organizations from the civilian sector approach R&D portfolio management?
Research Question 3:
Are there any capability development management practices from other Military Services
and civilian sector organizations that could be applied to the SDPE Office?
1.8 Thesis Preview
Chapter 2, the Literature Review, first synthesizes literature conveying the
difficulty of managing capability development. Second, it dives into the background of
Strategic Planning, Development Planning and Capability Development in the Air Force.
7

Third, it reviews the current capability development process used by the Air Force.
Finally, it surveys how sister U.S. Military Services, three foreign Military Services, and
a few civilian sector organizations manage capability development and Research and
Development. The Analysis and Results section (Chapter 3) summarizes applicable tools
and techniques for managing capability development and analyzes the overall trends and
differences found in the research. Finally, the Conclusion (Chapter 4) presents the
recommendations for the SDPE Office with practical implementation and wraps up the
research with potential future work.
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II. Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Challenges in Capability Development and Management
The foundation for R&D is uncertainty. There would be no need to research or
develop capabilities or products if everything was already known and understood
(Matheson and Matheson, 2016:8). The development of a capability is surrounded by
uncertainty. Changes in the warfighting environment, operational requirements or
evolving technologies are a few of the uncertainties that affect capability development.
One difficulty that Jain and Triandis note in their book Management of Research and
Development Organizations, is deciding when to end a research and development effort
“that does not seem to be solvable” (Jain and Triandis, 1997:13). Maintaining the
researcher’s “motivation and curiosity” (Jain and Triandis, 1997:4) is a challenge, but it
is a source for advancing research and development through “scientific breakthroughs
and product development” (Jain and Triandis, 1997:4). The unpredictability of
circumstances and outcomes makes managing capability development a difficult task.
It takes time to develop capabilities, sometimes entailing “a decade or longer,
which is beyond the lifetime of any administration” (Cohen, 2017:5). Keeping on track
with timelines and deadlines is a challenge, especially with all of the uncertainties and
risks that come with capability development. Also, if developing a capability requires
action from multiple organizations, coordination can be a challenge, especially if a
participating organization does “not have incentives to provide timely information”
(Parnell and others, 2013:294). Sometimes, an interdependency, such as one capability
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development project depending on the completion of another, can cause issues (Parnell
and others, 2013:294). Also, predicting funding for development of a capability can be a
challenge (Parnell and others, 2013:293).
Ultimately, Winthrop’s words summarize the whole situation with capability
development: “Predicting effectiveness for a technology, which has not yet been
invented, against an unknown enemy, for an unknown battle, in an unknown environment
is a daunting task. Yet, it is necessary to plan for an uncertain future” (Winthrop, 1999:3).
The next section provides a brief history and background of capability development in
the Air Force and the Department of Defense.
2.1.2 History and Background of Capability Development in the Air Force and DoD
Capability development stems from Strategic Planning, which is difficult because
predicting the future is based on uncertainty (no human knows what is going to happen in
the future). Still, Strategic Planning is essential and allows for the achievement of four
tasks: “allocat [ing] and justify[ing] resources; structur[ing] the force; defin[ing] and
shap[ing] the service’s mission and even identity; and perhaps most importantly,
creat[ing] a dialogue about the direction of the service” (Cohen, 2017:2). Cohen’s
analysis of the development of Strategic Planning in the Air Force covering the time
frame from the end of the Cold War to the present, presented five lessons as a way
forward in future Strategic Planning for the Air Force: “understanding the policy
environment; encouraging ideas from the bottom; starting the strategy from the top;
keeping the message succinct, substantive, and sharp; and focusing on process as much as
product” (Cohen, 2017:2, 59-67). The last lesson is evident within the Air Force today
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through its current Capability Development Process, but the process itself, as shown in
the following paragraphs, needed development and has been developed over time.
Development Planning influences the Air Force’s Capability Development
Process through supporting senior leadership in strategic decision making (Air Force
Studies Board, 2014:4), affecting which operational capabilities will be required to be
developed in the long run. In the late 1970s, there was an emphasis on the process of
Development Planning in the Air Force because General Slay, Commander of Air
Systems Command at the time, understood and saw “the need for a better system to
integrate the warfighter, S&T, and acquisition worlds” (Air Force Studies Board,
2014:15). In response to this need, the Vanguard program was introduced in 1978 and
one major component was the tool nicknamed “Hooks and Strings” (Air Force Studies
Board, 2014:14). This tool connected the combat commands, science and technology
community, and acquisition centers by obtaining answers to questions such as “Do all Air
Force advanced development (budget category 6.3) projects have a clear and recognized
trace back to some stated Air force capability, deficiency, or operational requirement?”
(Air Force Studies Board, 2014:14) and “Can assurance be provided that technology
work accomplished or under way by the Air Force laboratories is not duplicated in
contracts issued to defense contractors by Air Force program offices?” (Air Force Studies
Board, 2014:14).
Vanguard had several advantages, many of which resemble how the Air Force
approaches capability development today. One advantage of Vanguard was how it
organized planning into three major “areas: (1) mission plans, (2) major force elements,
and (3) functional plans” (Air Force Studies Board, 2014:14). These areas of focus grew
11

broader moving from “specific tasks” (Air Force Studies Board, 2014:14) with mission
plans to broad tasks (functional plans) encompassing multiple missions (Air Force
Studies Board, 2014:14). Another benefit from the Vanguard program was that an
essential group of personnel was formed and gathered, and included members from a
wide spread of fields, specifically intelligence, operations, acquisition, science and
technology, industry, independent research and development, finance, logistics, and
analysis, “who, together, identified the gaps, proposed solutions to mitigate the gaps, and
built capability roadmaps that integrated technology needs and program needs over a 20year period” (Air Force Studies Board, 2014:3). Finally, mandatory senior leadership
meetings, that took budget and funding information into consideration, kept all of the Air
Force domains and MAJCOMs accountable and involved in Development Planning (Air
Force Studies Board, 2014:15).
Between the 1980s and the first decade of this century, attention for Development
Planning (DP) reduced substantially due to a number of issues, including the downsizing
and reorganization of the Air Force and a decline in funding for Development Planning
(Air Force Studies Board, 2014:19-20). However, a fundamental analysis paper
proposing an “operationally oriented process” (Kent, 1989:iii) for Defense planning in
response to the disagreement between Congress and the defense community on the
“relationship between U.S. military strategies and the defense budgets” (Kent, 1989:v)
was published in 1989 by the late Glenn A. Kent. He was a defense policy strategist
whose influence reached farther than his careers in the Air Force and the Research And
Development (RAND) corporation alone. His analysis, titled “A Framework for Defense
Planning” was completed for the Air Force, but is applicable to the other Services and the
12

DoD. His framework suggested the use of a capability hierarchy that “link[ed] strategies
to tasks and programs” (Kent, 1989:16). In his words, “the approach provides a
systematic tool for assessing the degree to which tasks are accomplished and operational
objectives are achieved and for identifying problem areas” (Kent, 1989:16). The
components of the capability hierarchy ordered from the operational level (low) to the
strategic level (high) were: operational tasks, operational objectives, regional strategies,
national military strategy, and finally the national security strategy (Kent, 1989:v-vi).
Remnants of his “Force planning process” (Kent, 1989:16-18) and “Strategies-to-Tasks
Process” (Kent, 1989:17-19) are observable in the interaction between the Air Force’s
current Strategy, Planning and Programming Process (SP3) and Capability Development
Process.
Later in 2010, the Air Force Materiel Command Directorate of Intelligence and
Requirements (AFMC A2/5) expressed the importance of Development Planning by
publishing a Development Planning Guide (Intelligence, 2010). This guide framed
Development Planning as an enabler for improving the acquisition process (Intelligence,
2010). Also, the early definition of Development Planning, represented in this Guide,
encompassed many factors representative of capability development today, including
cost, risk and performance assessments and “best practices and processes to ensure
successful early acquisition planning” (Intelligence, 2010:1). As Development Planning
went in and out of focus for a few years, its priority in the Air Force was firmly
recognized in 2014 by the driving report titled: Development Planning: A Strategic
Approach to Future Air Force Capabilities (Air Force Studies Board, 2014). This report
was published by the Air Force Studies Board and the National Research Council. It
13

recommended that the current Air Force definition of Development Planning be
established above all others and increased the awareness and importance of Development
Planning and capability development across the entire Air Force.
In all branches of the military, before a capability can be developed, its
requirement must be validated by senior leadership. After a capability requirement is
validated, various organizations within a Military Service begin investigating in
capability solutions. Defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the two major approaches to
filling capability requirements in the Department of Defense: materiel and non-materiel
solutions. A materiel solution refers to “correction of a deficiency, satisfaction of a
capability gap, or incorporation of a new technology that results in the development,
acquisition, procurement, or fielding of a new item” (emphasis added) (Department of the
Air Force, 2013:81). On the other hand, a non-materiel solution addresses capability
development through eight categories distinguished by the following acronym:
DOTmLPF-P (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015b). The eight categories are designated as
follows: D – Doctrine, O – Organization, T – Training, m – materiel, L – Leadership and
Education, P – Personnel, F – Facilities, and P – Policy. Please note that the “m” for
materiel in the DOTmLPF-P acronym is distinct from the major approach to filling a
capability requirement described earlier. Although both result as a physical item or
software, the DOTmLPF-P materiel “is restricted to commercial or non-developmental
items that may be purchased commercially or by purchasing more systems from an
existing materiel program” (Department of the Air Force, 2013:82). Also, some
references in this research distinguish these joint capabilities by using a capital M,
Materiel, to refer to a new system, and a lower-cased m, materiel, to refer to a
14

commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) system. Unless otherwise noted, the term materiel in
this research refers to the first definition (not DOTmLPF-P).
As mentioned above, the DoD handles capability gaps and opportunities through
two major approaches: non-materiel and materiel. Non-materiel capability solutions
come about through DOTmLPF-P changes, while materiel capability solutions come
about through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)
process. The following section dives deeper into DOTmLPF-P changes, while the
subsequent section reviews the JCIDS process.
Gaining capability through a non-materiel approach is possible by modifying a
DOTmLPF-P area. The following section provides example scenarios in which capability
requirements, gaps and opportunities were filled through Joint DOTmLPF-P changes. On
a side note, the term “joint” in this research refers to a combination of DoD Military
Services (i.e. does not include other departments in DoD or any external departments).
Doctrinal change.
Over time, the Army’s sustainment doctrine contained over 100 manuals for
topics ranging from field operations to tactics, techniques and procedures. Because of the
vast amount of sustainment doctrine, soldiers found it hard to digest, keeping them from
understanding the concepts and applying them where necessary. The capability gap of
having insufficient awareness of sustainment doctrine in the community was addressed in
2012, when the Army published the Doctrine 2015 Initiative to consolidate doctrine for
easier review and continuous updating (Hodge, 2012). Once the doctrine was reduced and
released, sustainment soldiers gained the capability of quickly and sufficiently digesting
doctrine in order to apply it when necessary.
15

Organizational change.
In relation to the rise in cyber attacks around the globe over the years, a capability
gap of disjoint cyber forces was identified in the DoD. In 2009, the then United States
Secretary of Defense directed the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) to establish
CYBERCOM (Cyber Command), a joint subcommand, for addressing the capability gap
of disjoint cyber forces and cyber vulnerabilities (“U.S. Cyber,” 2016). In 2010,
CYBERCOM was fully operational and the U.S. Department of Defense gained the
capability of having a unified structure to perform joint military operations (defense and
offense) in the cyber environment.
Training change.
In 2014, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin E. Dempsey
deliberated over the capability requirement for a future “ISR Joint Force” (Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014:ii) in the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Joint Force 2020 White Paper. Accordingly, a capability solution was implemented
through regular Joint training exercises by the United States Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM) in order to solidify joint Service collaboration and preparation
for deployments. In particular, the USSOCOM Emerald Warrior 17 Training Exercise
joined DoD conventional and special operations forces to incorporate “ISR Integration”
(Holochwost, 2017: par. 6) of the MC-12 Aircraft, among other objectives; enhancing the
ISR Joint Force capability that General Dempsey addressed in the paper mentioned
earlier.
Materiel change.

16

In the late 1990s, the Navy’s E-2 Hawkeye Mission Computer platform ran into a
capability gap that “inhibited the ability to integrate modern, more advanced Command,
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence and Surveillance (C4IS) weapons
systems into the aircraft” (“E-2C,” 2004:par. 5). To address the capability gap, the Navy
worked with Northrop Grumman and developed a “Mission Computer Replacement” that
used commercial off-the-shelf technology, allowing the aircraft to gain more reliability
capability.
Leadership and Education change.
Officer leadership and education has evolved since the inception of each of the
U.S. Military Services, but the requirement for educated and skilled leaders in the
military to execute the President’s orders in defending our nation has not changed (U.S.
Const. art. II, sec. 3). This capability requirement is filled when various commissioning
sources, i.e. a U.S. Service Academy, Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC), or
Officer Candidate School (OCS), supply the Military Services with critical thinking
leaders with every Officer graduate.
Personnel change.
The Armed Forces need experienced and skilled military professionals in the
workplace. Over time, the Department of Defense found a capability gap of losing
professionals due to various individual life circumstances. In order to combat the loss of
personnel, the DoD investigated various ways of retaining talent and experience in the
Military Services, and as a result, the Career Intermission Program (CIP) was piloted in
2009 (United States Congress, 2008:Sec. 533) and extended to 2019 (United States
Congress, 2014:Sec. 522). CIP gives each Military Service the capability of retaining a
17

certain amount of talent and technical expertise that would have been lost through
separation (Navy Military Personnel Plans and Policy Director, 2017).
Facilities change.
From the 1940s to 1950s, the Navy built piers to enable ships to dock at bases for
entry and departure (Cole and Farmer, 2007:1). Rising water levels at Naval bases and
aging/degrading facilities created the capability requirement for better piers (Parker,
2017). In order to fulfill the need for upgrading and/or acquiring new piers, the Naval
Station Norfolk “[chose] to replace its aging piers with double deck piers” (Cole and
Farmer, 2007:1). These new double deck piers equip the Naval Station Norfolk to have
the capability to face rising water levels with advanced protection and more efficient
operations.
Policy change.
Recognition of the capability gap of potential loss of talent, motivated then
Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James to enact a Policy Memorandum involving
new accessions into the Air Force in 2017 (Secretary of the Air Force, 2017). It allowed
waivers on a case by case basis, for previously disqualifying medical matters, such as
eczema and ADHD. The policy change also relaxed tattoo limits. These changes gave the
Air Force the capability to “recruit and retain America’s top talent, with the intent of
ensuring that Air Force policy reflects a logical and evidence-based approach that is
representative of today’s society while also supporting the AF mission” (Secretary of the
Air Force, 2017:Attachment).
The previous examples demonstrate how the DoD has successfully filled
capability requirements and gaps through non-materiel solutions. The following
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paragraphs give a brief overview of how materiel capability requirements and solutions
are “identif[ied], assess[ed], validat[ed], and prioritize[ed]” (Joint Chiefs of Staff,
2015b:1) through the JCIDS process. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System (JCIDS) process is the formal procedure used for critically examining a materiel
capability requirement before it undergoes the DoD Acquisition Process to result in a
joint materiel capability solution. JCIDS is one of the three processes that make up the
framework for the DoD Acquisition Process, as seen in Figure 1.

Figure 1. DoD Acquisition Process Framework (“JCIDS Process Overview,” 2017)
The other two processes in the DoD Acquisition Process Framework are the Defense
Acquisition System (DAS) process (not to be confused with the overall DoD Acquisition
Process) and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process
(Defense Acquisition Guide, 2017:Ch 1-3.2). As seen in Figure 1, all of these processes
intertwine and affect each other (Department of Defense, 2017b:5). This framework
shows how capability development is one of the many parts of an acquisition process.
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At the beginning of the JCIDS process, capability needs and opportunities are
identified by various entities including the Military Services, Combatant Commands
(CCMDs) and Functional Capability Boards (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015a:page A-1).
Afterward, these operational requirements are assessed, analyzed and compared by
various tools, such as Capabilities Based Assessments (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015c:page
C-B-1) and Capability Portfolios (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015c:pages B-1, B-5;
Department of Defense, 2017a:2). Finally, the capability requirements are routed up
through various Review Boards to result in a prioritized list of validated capability
requirements that would best benefit the DoD overall (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015b:1-2).
Now that the history and background of strategic planning, development planning, and
capability development in the Air Force and DoD is familiar, the next section expands on
the current status of capability development in the Air Force.
2.2 Current Air Force Capability Development Management Methods
Air Force capability development is organized as “an iterative, need-driven cycle”
(Department of the Air Force, 2016:21). The needs for capability development are
products of strategic-level guidance and planning events. These events tackle high-level
problem areas and future objectives by considering inputs from various Air Force
“entities,” (Department of the Air Force, 2016:22) including Major Commands
(MAJCOMs), Headquarters Air Force (HAF), Capability Development Working Group
(CDWG) and Core Function Leads (CFLs) (Department of the Air Force, 2016:22).
The Air Force Capability Development Process is shown in Figure 2, which
depicts how actions and events feed into (illustrated by the arrows) each other. The Air
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Force Capability Development Process starts by laying out all of the capabilities that are
currently available, and then aligning them with Air Force Strategy (Step 1). Next, gaps
and opportunities in capability are identified, and then prioritized (Step 2). Following
prioritization, the Capability Development Working Group examines all of the
information gathered about the needs of the Air Force and recommends to Senior leaders
(Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force), a limited number of
primary “focus areas” (Department of the Air Force, 2016:23) that impact multiple
domains of the Air Force (Step 3). Then, Air Force Senior leaders select the areas they
deem to have greatest precedence (Step 4) and Analysis teams, including Enterprise
Capability Collaboration Teams (ECCTs), are formed and instituted to tackle and
mitigate those issues/opportunities (Step 5). After ECCTs/Analysis teams are coalesced,
“Capability Development Plans and Roadmaps” (Department of the Air Force, 2016:24)
are created and submitted to Senior leadership for review and approval (Step 6). Once a
Capability Development Plan (CDP) is approved, “Development Planning and
Experimentation” (Department of the Air Force, 2016:23) is initiated through “nonmateriel and JCIDS acquisition processes” (Department of the Air Force, 2016:25;
Directorate, 2017) and Courses of Actions (COAs) are researched, analyzed, developed,
and tested by the ECCTs/Analysis teams (Step 7). Periodic reviews by the Capability
Development Council (CDC) and Senior leadership focus on: “ECCT progress”
(Department of the Air Force, 2016:25) and possible changes to Strategic priorities.
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Figure 2. Air Force CD Process Overview (modified from Fig. 5.2 of AFGM 2016-90-1101)

The SDPE Office is involved in steps four through seven of the Capability Development
Process. After senior leaders select the “focus areas” in step four and institute the ECCTs
in step five, the SDPE Office is notified and begins supporting and managing the ECCT
and monitoring progress of achieving the goals set forth by senior leadership. In step six,
the SDPE Office keeps record of the Capability Development Plan(s) for future
reference. In the final step, the SDPE Office sponsors Experimentation Campaigns and
keeps records of ECCT research and analysis. Even after the ECCT is decommissioned
after a year, the SDPE Office is responsible for continuity and expertise of ECCT
knowledge, documentation, recommendations, etc. Considering all this, the Air Force
Capability Development Process gives a general overview of how the Air Force currently
manages capability development and provides a basis for understanding and comparing
other methods of management.
A related method for managing capability development is making use of a Value
Hierarchy Model, a tool found in the Operations Research Decision Analysis (DA) field.
The following paragraphs briefly summarize Decision Analysis, explain Value Hierarchy
Models, and lastly describe an Air Force application of Value Hierarchy Models.
According to Keeney, Decision Analysis is “a philosophy, articulated by a set of logical
axioms, and a methodology and collection of systematic procedures, based upon those
axioms, for responsibly analyzing the complexities inherent in decision problems”
(Keeney, 1982:806). The analysis in DA is meant to “illuminate complexity and provide
insight” (Keeney, 1982:803). The guiding motivation for Decision Analysis is to
consistently and continually make better decisions. Oftentimes, an organization’s success
is based off of its decision-making ability, which involves how it approaches decisions
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and how it strives to improve decision-making. Typically, as an organization continues
making better (good and sound) decisions, more successful outcomes (rather than
unsuccessful) result (Parnell et al., 2013). One method for helping make better decisions
is Value-Focused Thinking (VFT).
The Value-Focused Thinking approach to decision making made a large impact in
the Decision Analysis field. Keeney sums up the difference between VFT and traditional
Alternative-focused thinking: “Value-focused thinking involves starting at the best and
working to make it a reality. Alternative-focused thinking is starting with what is readily
available and taking the best of the lot” (Keeney, 1992:6). In the end, Value-Focused
Thinking “should lead to better consequences” (Keeney, 1992:viii). One tool used for
deconstructing complex decisions through VFT for better decision making is the Value
Hierarchy Model.
The Value Hierarchy Model was created to help a Decision maker(s) (DM)
evaluate decision alternatives based off his or her values/criteria/objectives. A Value
Hierarchy Model is structured in layers that become increasingly detailed moving from
the decision to be made (first, most broad layer), to the Decision maker’s values
immediately after, followed by the middle level objectives and criteria, and finally to the
last level of evaluation measures. An example of a Value Hierarchy that was used to
analyze a decision to buy the best word processor software (Kirkwood, 1997:15) is
represented in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Word Processor Decision Value Hierarchy Example (Kirkwood, 1997:15)
The company utilizing the Value Hierarchy in Figure 3, values both “cost” and
“suitability for use” (Kirkwood, 1997:15) for deciding which word processor to purchase.
Each of those values can be further decentralized into various objectives and criteria.
Finally, the tail ends of the objectives contain reasonable measures for evaluating how
well the corresponding objective or criteria is met.
An example of a VFT Value Hierarchy Model used for Air Force capability
management is found within Winthrop’s thesis titled: Technology Selection for the Air
Force Research Laboratory Air Vehicles Directorate: An Analysis using Value Focused
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Thinking (Winthrop, 1999). His Sponsor, the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) Air
Vehicles Directorate, was responsible for deciding on technology investments for the
future. Therefore, Winthrop created a “Technology Selection Model” (a Value Hierarchy
variant) that integrated and utilized Air Force level values to evaluate various technology
investment options (Winthrop, 1999:3). Value Hierarchy Models are still used today and
one containing SDPE and Air Force values, objectives, and evaluation measures could be
used as a tool to manage capability development. Attention to capability development is
not only restricted to the Air Force; the Army and the Navy concentrate on capability
development as well.
2.3 Capability Development in Sister Military Services
2.3.1 Army
TRADOC, one of the Army’s three Commands, stands for Training and Doctrine
Command. It focuses on “chang[ing] the Army for the Future” (“TRADOC,” 2017)
through four priorities: Design, Acquire, Build, and Improve as seen in Figure 4. Figure 4
also displays TRADOC’s Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), which is a
Core Function Lead that was instituted in 2006 (Department of the Army, 2006b).
ARCIC supports the Army through concept and capability development, evaluation, and
integration “across DOTMLPF, functions and formations – to provide Soldiers and units
the capabilities they need to support Combatant Commanders” (Department of the Army,
2013:16). ARCIC’s Capabilities Development Directorate is divided into nine divisions
that focus on perspectives ranging from the “Reliability, Availability and Maintainability
(RAM) requirements and policy” (“Capabilities Development,” 2018) to the “human
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dimension ... encompassing the cognitive, physical, and social components to optimize
the performance of Soldiers, leaders, and teams” (“Capabilities Development,” 2018;
Department of the Army, 2006a:6). These divisions and directorates support the
Combined Arms Center’s (CAC) Centers of Excellence (CoEs) (Department of the
Army, 2013:138). These CoEs are divided by the Army’s functional areas, such as Fires,

Figure 4. TRADOC Organizational Chart (adapted from (“TRADOC,” 2018))

Maneuver, and Cyber, as seen in Figure 4.
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The Army manages capability development in three phases: (1) Concept
Development, (2) Capabilities Determination, and (3) Capabilities Integration
(Department of the Army, 2013:9-12). As a brief introduction, concepts were
contemplated in 1979 by then Army TRADOC Commander, General Donn A. Starry in
his Commander’s Notes Number 3 titled, “Operational Concepts and Doctrine” (Army
Commanding General, 1979). The Joint Chiefs of Staff Guidance for Developing and
Implementing Joint Concepts specifies that a joint concept “identifies a current or future
military challenge and proposes a solution to improve the joint force’s ability to address
that military challenge. A joint concept may also propose new ways to employ the joint
force based on future technology” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016:GL-4). Taking both of the
previous references into consideration, the Army recognizes that concepts define four
areas: “how the force functions (operational concept), the timeframe and conditions it
must be able to operate in (the OE), its physical and organizational characteristics (design
parameters and architecture), and what it must be able to execute (required capabilities)
in terms of performing missions or producing effects” (Department of the Army,
2013:33). The development of concepts in the Army is based off of the Joint Concept
Development Process. This process is part of the Joint Concept Life Cycle, as seen in
Figure 5. The Joint Concept Development Process starts with “identify[ing] future
military challenges” and ends with “concept approval” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016:A-6).
Note that a Joint Concept General Officer Steering Committee (JC GOSC) is responsible
for “guidance and oversight of the JCD [Joint Concept Development] Program” (Joint
Chiefs of Staff, 2016:D-3).
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Figure 5. Joint Concept Life Cycle (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016:A-6)
One of the things that the Army Concept Framework (ACF) identifies and
produces is required capabilities. The ACF organizes concepts into four sections: (1) the
Army Capstone Concept (ACC), (2) the Army Operating Concept (AOC), (3) Army
Functional Concepts (AFC), and (4) advisory documents (i.e. “white papers and concept
of operations (CONOPS) papers” (Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2014:9)). The
amount of detail describing concepts increases as one moves from the Army Capstone
Concept (section 1) of the ACF, to the Army Functional Concepts (section 4). The Army
Capstone Concept gives a general overview of “how the future Army, as part of the joint
force, will operate across the range of military operations” (Army Training and Doctrine
Command, 2014:8). The Army Capstone Concept guides the Army Operating Concept
and both, in turn, guide the Army Functional Concepts. Required capabilities are detailed
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enough in the Army Functional Concepts, that Capabilities Based Assessments (CBAs)
can be created from them (Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2014:8-9). A CBA is
defined as “an analytic process that identifies capability requirements and associated
capability gaps” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016:GL-3). The Army Concept Framework and
the Army Concept Development Process are embedded in the “Concept” portion of the
Army’s Concept to Solutions Roadmap, displayed in Figure 6.

Figure 6. Army Concept to Solutions Roadmap (Army Training and Doctrine Command,
2014:10)
The Army’s capability development management phases of Concept
Development, Capabilities Determination, and Capabilities Integration are embedded in
the Army Concept to Solutions Roadmap. In the Army’s Concept to Solutions Roadmap,
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concepts are based on problems/challenges that come up due to a number of reasons,
such as changes in the Operational Environment, weaknesses in current capabilities, or
changes in strategy directed by higher level leadership (Army Training and Doctrine
Command, 2014:10). The drafted concepts address the problems. Afterward the concepts
are evaluated during the “Analysis” phase to ensure that the concepts themselves, and the
associated capabilities are qualified for further development (concept development).
Finally, once the “concept-required capabilities” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016:A-3) are
determined (capabilities determination), they are integrated “to merge, de-conflict, and
synchronize functional, organizational, and DOTMLPF capability requirements and
solutions to unify and improve warfighting capabilities” (Department of the Army,
2013:41) (capabilities integration). The next section investigates how the Navy manages
and organizes capability development and integration.
2.3.2 Navy
The Department of the Navy is organized into three overarching areas: Executive,
Shore Establishment and Operating Forces (“United States Government Manual,”
2017:Department of the Navy). Each of these areas has entities that contribute to
developing and integrating capabilities for the Navy. For the Executive area, the Office of
Naval Research (ONR) researches, provides, and manages capabilities for the Navy. The
Navy’s Shore Establishment contains several Systems support components for the Navy’s
Operating forces (referred to as the “Fleet”), as highlighted in the Shore Establishment
row in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. Naval Shore Establishment and Operating Forces (“United States Government Manual,” 2017:Department of the
Navy)

Four of the Systems Commands of the Navy’s Shore Establishment provide and manage
significant capabilities pertaining to: Naval Sea Systems, Naval Air Systems, Space and
Naval Warfare Systems, and Strategic Systems (“United States Government Manual,”
2017:Department of the Navy). Also, the Naval Warfare Development Command and
Navy Warfighting Development Centers directly support the Operating Forces
(Department of the Navy, 2018), as seen in Figure 8.

Figure 8. Navy Development Command and Centers
The Navy Warfighting Development Centers (WDC) were established within the last five
years at the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations (Deboer, 2017:par. 9; “Wanted,”
2017:6). They support the Navy Fleet by integrating their individual warfighting Focus
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Areas (information, undersea, expeditionary, aviation, and surface and mine) “into Naval
warfighting” (Deboer, 2017:par. 11). Each WDC engages in four lines of operation: (1)
“enhancing advanced level training” (Deboer, 2017:par.6), (2) “development of doctrine”
(Deboer, 2017:par. 7), (3) “cultivat[ing] and develop[ing] … subject matter expertise”
(Deboer, 2017:par. 8), and (4) assessing the organization’s three other lines of operation
and its other capabilities for improvement (Deboer, 2017:par. 9).
The Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC) was established in 1998
(Navy Warfare, 2017b:par. 8) and it is currently responsible for the development and
integration of “innovative solutions to complex naval warfare challenges to enhance
current and future warfighting capabilities” (“The NWDC Mission,” 2018) across the
Navy, similar to the Air Force’s Strategic Development Planning and Experimentation
Office’s role. It carries out its duties through heading the Navy Capability Generation and
Concept Development Program (Department of the Navy, 2014:9) and conducting “a
variety of forums including flag level summits, tactical and operational level war games,
and fleet experimentation initiatives that bring together all the WDCs in order to get at
fully integrated, all-domain solutions” (Navy Warfare, 2017a:par. 3). The seven areas of
responsibility for NWDC are: Concepts, Concept of Operations (CONOPS),
Experimentation, Doctrine, Lessons Learned, Wargaming, and Modeling & Simulation
(“Products and Services,” 2018).
One finding from the previous sections of research on Navy structure was that it
grouped capability development into significant Focus Areas (Sea Systems, Air Systems,
Information Warfighting, Expeditionary Warfighting, etc.) and then assigned
organizations to each Focus Area. Then, some of the organizations were held responsible
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for managing capability development through an inner office, center, or structure. For
example, the “Air Systems” Focus Area is led by the Naval Air Systems Command
(NAVAIR), which has assigned two noticeable capability development management
branches, namely, Research & Engineering and Test & Evaluation (“NAVAIR
Overview," 2017), as shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9. Naval Air Systems Command Structure (“NAVAIR Overview," 2017)
Another way that the Navy manages capability development is through senior
level review boards. In 2008, the Department of the Navy established two authoritative
Capability Boards: the Resources and Requirements Review Board (R3B) and the Naval
Capabilities Board (NCB). The 3-Star General level R3B is the ultimate decision
authority on “Navy capability requirements” (Department of the Navy, 2008b:1), while
the NCB manages capability development one level below the Resources and
Requirements Review Board “by reviewing and making decisions on Navy requirement
and resource issues” (Department of the Navy, 2008a:1). Two key members of the
Resources and Requirements Review Board who have capability development
management responsibilities are the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of
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Capabilities and Resources (CNO N8) and the Principal Deputy Assisant Secretary of the
Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition) (PDASN (RD&A)) (Department of the
Navy, 2008b:2). These two individuals play an important role in the Naval Capability
Development Process and their positions provide more understanding of how the Navy
structures capability development.
Capability development “decision making authorit[y]” (Department of the Navy,
2008b:Encl. 1) is divided between the two Boards based off of DoD Program Acquisition
Categories (ACATs) and other classifications. As a brief introduction to ACATs, an
Acquisition Program is defined as “a directed, funded effort that provides a new,
improved, or continuing materiel, weapon or information system, or service capability in
response to an approved need” (Department of Defense, 2007:2). The DoD organizes
Acquisition Programs into categories (ACATs) that are primarily designated by
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) thresholds and Total
Procurement thresholds, as seen in Table 2.
Table 2. ACAT Categories and Thresholds (adapted from DoDI 5000.02, Table 1)

In the Navy, the Resources and Requirements Review Board is assigned as the “decision
making authorit[y]” (Department of the Navy, 2008a:Encl 1) for ACAT I programs that
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have the Joint Requirement Oversight Council’s (JROC) special attention, while the
Naval Capabilities Board is responsible for ACAT II programs with “non JROC interest”
(Department of the Navy, 2008a:Encl 1). Both the R3B and NCB being involved in the
Capability Development Process of the Navy, supports evidence of more of the Navy’s
structure for managing capability development and integration.
The Naval Capabilities Development Process (NCDP) capitalizes on Capabilities
Based Assessments (Department of the Navy, 2011:page 1-5) and is summarized in
Figure 10.

Figure 10. NCDP (adapted from SECNAVINST 5000.2, page 1-5)
The Naval Capabilities Development Process takes guidance from strategy and
warfighter concepts to produce the Integrated Capabilities Plan (ICP) (Department of the
Navy, 2011:page 1-5). The ICP is a portfolio of all of the Navy’s capability investments
and “serves as the Navy’s ‘warfare investment strategy’ for programming operational
capabilities” (Department of the Navy, 2011:page 1-5). While the Integrated Capabilities
Plan is being formed, organizations who will be sponsoring resources for a capability are
managing finances through “programming and analysis” (Department of the Navy,
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2011:page 1-5). Both the Integrated Capabilities Plan and the resource sponsor’s
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution activities are used to form the
Sponsor Program Proposal (SPP). The SPP delineates the Systems that corresponding
operational capabilities (listed in the ICP) are contingent upon for functionality. For
clarification, an example of the dependent relationship between a System and a capability
can be seen with the “Duplexer” Naval Radar System. Before this System was made
available, an individual antenna was capable of either only transmitting or only receiving
data. The “Duplexer” System activated the capability of both “transmitting and
receiving” (“Naval Radar Systems,” 2018) data through one antenna. Moving back to the
Naval Capabilities Development Process, after a System is validated through the Sponsor
Program Proposal, it is acquired through the DoD Acquisition Process, ultimately
resulting in a capability being put into the hands of the warfighter (Department of the
Navy, 2011:page 1-5). The next section reviews how a few civilian sector organizations
and foreign militaries approached capability development management.
2.4 Civilian R&D and Foreign Military Capability Development Management
The primary motivations to develop capabilities, found in the literature for this
section, were national defense (Lee and Yoon, 2015:1309-1310), market competition
(Kolk and Rungi, 2012:6), and organization/personal improvement (Matheson and
Matheson, 2016; Covey, 2004). For the national defense motivation, Lee and Yoon
compare the development of three foreign military aircraft industries. Each aircraft
industry development process involved four key factors: (1) “international technology
transfer agreements” (Lee and Yoon, 2015:1296), (2) the “technology acquisition mode”

38

(Lee and Yoon, 2015:1297), which referred to the initial emphasis of either making or
buying aircraft at the start of the industry, (3) the “role of foreign partners” (Lee and
Yoon, 2015:1296) either actively or passively engaging with the respective developing
aircraft industry, and (4) government “industrial policy initiatives” (Lee and Yoon,
2015:1299) in support of Research and Development. An aircraft industry gained further
development as factors one, three, and four improved. Currently, South Korea, China and
Brazil have an improved military capability of national defense due to the development
of each respective aircraft industry.
For the market competition motivation, Kolk and Rungi studied and assessed how
four major “information and communication technology (ICT)” (Kolk and Rungi,
2012:6) companies developed capabilities in relation to market partnerships. They
categorized ICT capabilities into four areas: Transformative, Intrinsic, Directions, and
Combinative (Kolk and Rungi, 2012:12-13). Transformative and Intrinsic Capabilities
sided on “exploitive” (Kolk and Rungi, 2012:5) activities, while Directions and
Combinative Capabilities sided on “explorative” (Kolk and Rungi, 2012:7) activities. In
organizational learning theory, exploitation deals with “practicing activities” (Kolk and
Rungi, 2012:7) while exploration deals with “learning activities” (Kolk and Rungi,
2012:7). After analyzing market evolvement information on each ICT company, Kolk
and Rungi found that overall, the majority of capability focus was on exploitive activities
(Kolk and Rungi, 2012:15-16). They also confirmed that all of the companies exhibited
“open” partnerships (Kolk and Rungi, 2012:12). “Open” partnerships meant a company
displayed a minimal number of repeated alliances with other firms and more alliances
with firms outside of their Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) business fields (Kolk
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and Rungi, 2012:10). Kolk and Rungi’s organization of Google, Ericcson, Microsoft, and
Nokia’s capabilities, to study the development in respect to “market emergence, market
take-off, and market growth” (Kolk and Rungi, 2012:14), provide “best practices in
capability development that other companies could follow to achieve similar results and
benefits” (Kolk and Rungi, 2012:6). Their conclusion that “exploitation prevails over
exploration” (Kolk and Rungi, 2012:18) conflicts with the Department of Defense’s
emphasis on the need for innovation and exploration in the Services.
For the organization/personal improvement motivation, Covey focuses on
improving an individual’s personal effectiveness based on “universal, timeless, selfevident principles common to every enduring, prospering society throughout history”
(Covey, 2004:7), and Matheson and Matheson argue that enhancing decision making
brings improvement and success to an organization. In order to develop the capability of
being personally effective, Covey expounds on seven achievable habits, each based on a
“principle or natural law that governs the results you seek” (Covey, 2004:7). These habits
and corresponding principles are organized in Figure 11.

Figure 11. Covey’s Seven Habits and Principles (Covey, 2004)
Understanding and instilling “realities” (Covey, 2004:24) and principles and working to
develop and achieve the seven habits, brings personal improvement and effectiveness.
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Matheson and Matheson agree that “smart” decision making will both orient and
keep an organization on the path to success. In the 1990s, they conducted a study of how
hundreds of companies (ranging from industrial chemicals and petroleum products to
electronic equipment and aerospace/defense) managed research and development (R&D)
decision making (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:65-6). After interviews and
questionnaire exchanges with the companies, Matheson’s Strategic Decision Group
compiled, identified, and developed a list of best practices for decision making
(enumerated in Section 3.2.1) (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:70-73). By working to
make these best practices a reality, an organization improves its R&D decision making,
which in turn, improves the organization itself.
Although the motivation for developing capabilities was different for all of the
studies in this section of the research, evidence of structure and management being
necessary for each capability development process was the same. This necessity prompts
the search for practices that would benefit the SDPE Office’s management of
responsibilities.
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III. Analysis and Results
3.1 Introduction
This section explores the tools and techniques that were chosen to be applied to
the Strategic Development Planning and Experimentation Office’s scenario of managing
their responsibilities and capability development. It also examines trends and differences
found among the Air Force, Army, and Navy.
3.2 Applicable Tools, Techniques
The following sections describe tools and techniques found in the literature that
have applicable use for the SDPE Office. First, their original application and setting are
described. Second, the application to the SDPE Office is described for future adaptation
or consideration.
3.2.1 Span of Control diagram with Best practices
In The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People, Covey categorizes problems of life
into three encompassing areas: Circle of Influence, Circle of Concern, and then No
Concern. The Circle of Influence is inside the Circle of Concern, while No Concern is
placed outside the Circles. He specifies these Circles further into four areas: Direct
Control, Indirect Control, No Control, and No Concern (Covey, 2004:85-86). An
example of an area in which one has direct control over is one’s own behavior. Those
problems that we have influence over but do not directly control, often “[involve] other
people’s behavior” (Covey, 2004:85). The areas of Concern in our lives that we have no
control over, cover issues “we can do nothing about, such as our past or situational
realities” (Covey, 2004:85). Finally, there are problems in life that do not concern us at
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all. As one works in the area of Direct Control, one’s Circle of Influence expands in the
Circle of Concern. Covey’s organizational structure of life problems for personal use, can
be used to organize the SDPE Office’s responsibilities for managing capability
development. For this research, Covey’s areas are slightly adapted into the categories of
Control, Direct Influence, and Indirect Influence, as shown in the SDPE Office Span of
Control Figure 12.

Figure 12. SDPE Office Span of Control (adapted from Covey’s Circles of Concern and
Influence using material from AFGM 2016-90-1101)
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The first category under the SDPE Office’s span of control is the Circle of
Control. The SDPE Office has primary responsibility of the major tasks listed in its
Circle of Control. The second category is the Circle of Direct Influence. In this category,
the SDPE Office’s responsibilities have a straightforward impact on how an outside
organization does its job. For example, the SDPE Office’s responsibility of coordinating
ECCT updates and recommending actions to Senior Leadership (Department of the Air
Force, 2016:6; Air Force Studies Board, 2016:94) directly affects the CDC’s
responsibility of establishing ECCTs (Air Force Studies Board, 2016:93). The final
category under the SDPE’s span of control is the Circle of Indirect Influence. The SDPE
has indirect influence, and vice versa, on responsibilities listed in this last category. For
example, when one responsibility has a direct influence on another responsibility, that has
a direct influence on a third responsibility, then, the first responsibility has an indirect
influence on the third responsibility. This can be seen with the SDPE’s responsibility of
Sponsoring and overseeing experimentation (Air Force Studies Board, 2016:93) having
an indirect impact on the CDWG’s responsibility of recommending the prioritization of
capability gaps, strategic opportunities, and CD activities to the CDC (Air Force Studies
Board, 2016:94). In this example, the link between the two responsibilities is the
CDWG’s responsibility of reviewing and assessing the progress of Air Force CD (Air
Force Studies Board, 2016:94). The only way that the Capability Development Working
Group ensures credibility of its prioritized recommendations to the CDC is by reviewing
and assessing the progress of CD across the Air Force (Air Force Studies Board,
2016:94) (a responsibility that the SDPE Office has direct influence over through
involvement with ECCTs, wargaming and Experimentation Campaigns). If the SDPE
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Office uses and adds to this Span of Control diagram, it will maintain situational
awareness. Also, if it keeps track of the progress of all of the responsibilities placed in
each of the circles of control, it will be able to adjust and improve its responsibilities (1)
as a response to outside changing factors and (2) as a motivation to influence outside
organizations for efficiency and improvement.
Integrating high quality decision making into capability development
management will undoubtedly enhance the SDPE Office’s effectiveness in implementing
their responsibilities. This research proposes integrating high quality decision making
through applying a select number of best practices compiled by Matheson and Matheson
to the Strategic Development Planning and Experimentation Office. Matheson and
Matheson compiled a set of 45 best practices for “diagnosing and managing R&D
decision making” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:68). These best practices were grouped
into nine component areas: 1. Decision basis, 2. Technology Strategy, 3. Portfolio
Management, 4. Project Strategy, 5. Organization and Process, 6. Relationship with
internal customer, 7. Relationship with external customer, 8. R&D culture and values,
and 9. Improving decision quality, which were further combined into three emphasis
areas: Making quality decisions, Organizing for decision quality and Improving decision
quality, as shown in Figure 13 (The “Improving decision quality” area is included as both
a component and emphasis area).
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Figure 13. Best Practices for R&D Decision-Making (Matheson and Matheson, 1998:71 (Fig. 4-5))

After considering the Circles of Control for the SDPE Office, seven of the 45
practices were chosen for the Strategic Development Planning and Experimentation
Office to adapt for enhanced decision making, and are listed in Table 3.
Table 3. Applicable Decision-making Practices for SDPE Office

By working on the practices listed under the components Decision basis and Project
strategy, the SDPE Office will reinforce “making quality decisions” (Matheson and
Matheson, 2016:68). Similarly, developing and regularly implementing those practices
listed in the third column of Table 3 will aid the SDPE Office in improving future
decision making quality (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:70).
If Best Practices PS-3 and IQ-3 were applied while the SDPE Office built and
maintained ECCT tools, infrastructure, and corporate knowledge (Department of the Air
Force, 2016:24), the SDPE Office would (1) “create value” (Matheson and Matheson,
2016:71) for the organization and (2) “create frameworks for learning” (Matheson and
Matheson, 2016:71). The latter result allows for more steady personnel changeovers,
especially since the Armed Forces frequently relocate around the globe. If the SDPE
Office “quantif[ied] decision inputs” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:71) and “agree[d]
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on clear, measurable goals” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:71) while coordinating
ECCT updates and recommending actions to the CDC (Department of the Air Force,
2016:6; Air Force Studies Board, 2016:94), it would be able to consistently and
quantifiably track those updates and actions. Another responsibility the SDPE Office
must take on is deciding on what guidance is appropriate to provide to the ECCTs
(Department of the Air Force, 2016:6). If the basis of the SDPE Office’s decision
“ensures credible, consistent inputs” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:71), then the
guidance is confirmed to be trustworthy and reliable. Finally, after an ECCT is
decommissioned, if the SDPE Office “learn[s] from post-project audits” (Matheson and
Matheson, 2016:71) and “learn[s] from others worldwide” (Matheson and Matheson,
2016:71), it will improve the quality of its future decision making with respect to
“maintain[ing] the expertise needed to support ECCTs, CCTs, and experimentation
campaigns” (Department of the Air Force, 2016:24).
Other best practices were not selected for a number of reasons: they were out of
the SDPE Office’s control, they were another Organization’s responsibility, they were
not applicable to the SDPE Office, or they were already listed in the SDPE’s
responsibilities. For instance, the fourth Organization and Process best practice (OP-4) of
“us[ing] market incentives” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:71) was not applicable to the
SDPE Office, since being a part of a serving organization contradicts the idea of
considering market involvement. A different best practice, namely, “maintain[ing]
connections with research organizations” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:71) is an
example of an existent SDPE responsibility (hence the omission from the selected
applicable best practices). Finally, an example of a best practice that was not included
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because it was another organization’s responsibility is “PS-1: Fully resource projects”
(Matheson and Matheson, 2016:71). Another applicable tool this research suggests that
the SDPE Office implement is Matheson and Matheson’s Project Portfolio Matrix.
3.2.2 Capability Portfolio Matrix
Matheson and Matheson developed a Research and Development (R&D) “project
portfolio matrix” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:203) aimed at balancing “risk and
return” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:202). Their R&D portfolio management matrix is
reproduced in Figure 14.

Figure 14. The R&D Grid: Project Portfolio Matrix (Matheson and Matheson, 1998:203
(Fig. 10-2))
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The top left quadrant of the Capability Portfolio Matrix contains Bread-and-butter
projects, which maintain commercial competitiveness by improving existing projects that
are producing “regular results” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:203). These projects are
geared toward gaining incremental, near-term advantage. They have advanced enough to
overcome most, if not all, “hurdles (technical, financial, regulatory, etc.)” (Matheson and
Matheson, 2016:202). An example of a Bread-and butter project is “upgraded software
tools with new features and ease of use” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:204). This
project brings more efficiency to what is already available and in use (existing software).
Oysters are highly innovative and “early stage projects” (Matheson and Matheson,
2016:204) that give the organization the potential to gain “strategic advantage”
(Matheson and Matheson, 2016:203). These projects are “shifters” that move to other
quadrants as uncertainties about “technical feasibility” and “commercial potential”
(Matheson and Matheson, 2016:203) decrease. An example of an oyster project that
demonstrates the potential for having a major impact in the medical field is a “new
approach to pain control” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:204). Pearls emerge from
oysters that have advanced in technical feasibility. To find a pearl, an organization must
inspect and investigate numerous oysters (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:204). Finally,
White elephant projects provide minimal value to an organization and end up
squandering resources that could be used for any other type of project. These projects
usually start out as Oyster or Bread-and-butter projects with the potential to bring value
to the organization, but because of “technical defects” (Matheson and Matheson,
2016:205) or market environment changes, they end up being more of a burden.
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For future work, modifying this portfolio matrix by substituting a “military value”
measure for the “commercial value” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:203) measure,
allows it to be used by the SDPE Office for categorizing its capability development
projects or responsibilities.
After projects have been categorized into one of the four quadrants of the Project
Portfolio Matrix, Matheson and Matheson suggest managing each quadrant separately.
White elephant projects that have been identified, must be analyzed as soon as possible to
decide whether they can and should be redirected (to Bread-and-butter or Oyster Project)
or terminated (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:207). Bread-and-butter projects should be
rewarded based on “results and conformance to goals” (Matheson and Matheson,
2016:206), while Oysters should not. Since most Oysters are bound to fail, the
organization should focus on investigating whether or not the “technical hurdles”
(Matheson and Matheson, 2016:206) are surmountable. If so, the project shifts to become
a Pearl; if not, the project is terminated. Pearls are not meant to be measured by “shortterm deliverables” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:206), and should therefore be
“managed to encourage entrepreneurship” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:206) and
encourage “value creation” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:206).
If the SDPE Office categorized their capability development responsibilities
according to these Project Portfolio quadrants, it could then obtain insight and a general
overview of which areas received more (or less) attention (Matheson and Matheson,
2016:206-207). Afterward, it would need to address each quadrant according to the
management methods described in the previous paragraph (Matheson and Matheson,
2016:206-207). Finally, working to achieve an approximate balance of 90% Bread-and51

butter and Pearl Projects with 5-10% Oyster Projects (minimizing White Elephant
projects as much as possible) would provide the opportunity to explore innovative
projects and balance risk at the same time (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:202).
3.3 Trends and Differences
Each Military Service has designed a structure for managing capability
development, as summarized in Table 4.
Table 4. Military Service Capability Development Management Comparison
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Every one of the Services have multiple management levels of capability development
and integration. In the Air Force, the Strategic Development Planning and
Experimentation (SDPE) Office was placed under Air Force Materiel Command, under
the Air Force Research Laboratory. The Capability Development Working Group and the
SDPE Office have direct access to the Capability Development Council (CDC), which
has direct access to Air Force senior leadership. In the Navy, capability development and
integration management were distributed to one Warfare Command and several
Warfighting Centers. These Warfighting Centers are subordinate organizations placed
under the Naval Fleet to directly support the Operating Forces by the different Naval
Focus Areas. The Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC) is responsible for
developing and integrating capabilities across the Navy enterprise and performs its
mission through gathering the Warfighting Development Centers (WDC) and all domains
of the Navy for activities such as experimentation campaigns and warfighting games.
Both the NWDC and the WDCs have direct access to the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO). In the Army, the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) was placed
under the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), which has direct access to Army
headquarters. The ARCIC Capabilities Development Directorate supports the Centers of
Excellence (CoE) found under the Combined Arms Command (CAC). These CoEs were
divided by Army Functions such as Mission Command, Intelligence, and Sustainment.
The Army and Navy have multiple mid-level Capability Development and
Integration organizations, while the Air Force has one, the SDPE Office. This result
makes sense since the Air Force is smaller, in comparison, than each of the other Military
Services, but if the Air Force followed either of their structures, it could be beneficial.
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Also, both the Army and the Navy have capability development organizations that are
assigned to key Service-related Functional Areas, while the Air Force has individuals
(Core Function Leads) as liaisons between the operating environment and leadership.
Assigning a team devoted to tackling each Air Force Core Function may prove valuable.
Ultimately, the Air Force has a good start for managing capability development and
integration, especially with the recent (within the last three years) stand up of related
organizations. As it continues to advance in capability development management, the Air
Force can find useful guidance from reviewing the other Military Service’s methods for
managing capability development and integration.
One similarity found among all of the Military Services was the importance of
“pre-acquisition” (Air Force Studies Board, 2014:i) strategy development. This
importance is apparent through the Navy’s Concept Generation and Concept
Development (CGCD) Program, the Army Capabilities Integration Center’s Concept
Development and Learning Directorate, and the Air Force’s Development Planning
initiatives.
One distinct difference between the Services was how similar words and phrases,
such as “capability development” or “capabilities development,” had different meanings.
For example, the Army expresses “capabilities development” as a synonym for
“capabilities determination.” Both of these are defined as “the Army’s implementation of
the JCIDS process used to identify, assess, and document changes in DOTMLPF that
collectively produce the force capabilities and attributes prescribed in approved concepts,
CONOPS, or other authoritative sources” (Department of the Army, 2013:37). Thus, in
some respect, it seems that the Army uses this term specifically for JCIDS activities,
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while the Air Force uses it to encompass not only JCIDS activities, but DOTmLP-F
activities as well.
An interesting difference between the Army and the Navy is the echelon
determination for capability development organizations. The structure for Army
capability development from top to bottom is as follows: Army TRADOC Command,
Army Capabilities Integration Center, Army Capability Development and Integration
Directorate, and ARCIC Divisions (Focus Areas). For the Navy, the capability
development chain of commands starts with the Office of Naval Operations and branches
out to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities
and Resources (CNO N8), four major Naval Systems Commands, the Naval Warfare
Development Command and five Navy Warfighting Development Centers. Each of the
Systems Commands and Navy Warfighting Centers have subdivisions that tackle
capability development and integration. The Army’s approach to managing capability
development emphasizes capability development first, and then spreads that to specific
Army Functional Focus Areas, while one of the Navy’s approaches starts with Functional
Focus Areas and allows each Focus Area (Systems Command, Warfighting Development
Centers) to manage capability development and integration individually.
The studies by the civilian sector organizations gave best practices and lessons
learned for managing problems, capabilities, and projects. Although each of the
categories managed was different, the management methods explored in these studies
provided insight and application for the SDPE Office to investigate and possibly adapt
these methods.

55

IV. Conclusion
4.1 Research Questions and Findings
The Research questions and findings are as follows:
Research Question 1:
How do other Military Services approach capability development management?
Research Findings:
The Army organizes capability development through a structural multi-level hierarchy
with the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) as the head and Capability
Development Integration Directorates (CDIDs) as the extensions. The CDIDs work with
the Combined Arms Center’s Functional Centers of Excellence (CoEs) to address
capability development and integration in the Army.
The Navy has three entities that focus on capability development and integration. The
Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC) is responsible for integrating
capabilities across Navy functions and domains, while the Navy Warfighting
Development Centers (WDCs) address capabilities categorized by warfighting functions
(for example, Surface and Mine warfighting and Undersea warfighting) in direct support
of the Fleet. Finally, the Naval Systems Commands have subdivisions which are
responsible for addressing capability development and integration according to the Naval
Systems category (i.e. Sea Systems, Air Systems, Space and Naval Warfare Systems, and
Strategic Systems).

Research Question 2:
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How do organizations from the civilian sector approach R&D portfolio management?
Research Findings:
Matheson and Matheson’s Project Portfolio matrix used measures of technical feasibility
and commercial potential (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:203) to evaluate Research and
Development projects, while Covey’s Span of Control chart classified responsibilities
into Control and Influence categories that allowed for tracking the status of all tasks for
organization efficiency and improvement.

Research Question 3:
Are there any capability development management practices from other Military Services
and civilian sector organizations that could be applied to the SDPE Office?
Research Findings:
The Army and Navy’s organizational practice of structuring capability development
management with a few “lead” commands and multiple operational-level centers and
divisions could be adapted in the Strategic Development and Planning Experimentation
Office and the Air Force.
Covey’s Span of Control chart can be applied to the SDPE Office for categorizing and
tracking its capability development management responsibilities.
Matheson and Matheson’s Capability Portfolio Matrix can also be useful to the SDPE
Office for project categorization and tracking.
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4.2 Recommendations
It is recommended that the Air Force considers the Army or Navy’s capability
development management structure as it continues structuring its own capability
development forces. Also, this research recommends that the SDPE Office implement the
capability development management tools from Section 3.2 for one year, to figure out
which practices and tools produce the best results. Additionally, after one year of using a
management tool, documenting an After Action Reports (AAR), evaluation, or lessons
learned is suggested for future research. Furthermore, this research seeks to bring the
SDPE Office awareness of the trends and differences found in Section 3 of the Results
and Analysis Chapter (Chapter 3).
4.3 Future Work/Research
After digging into this research, opportunities for future work emerged. One of
these opportunities is conducting a longitudinal study of an Air Force Program that is
currently in use by the warfighter in the field. Investigating an Air Force Program from
birth to acquisition would provide much insight into the Air Force’s capability
development and integration process. Working with the Air Force Materiel Command’s
Air Force Life Cycle Management Center would be beneficial for this longitudinal study.
Another opportunity for future work is creating a Multiple Objective Decision
Analysis Value Hierarchy in relation to this research’s suggestion, in Section 4.2.2, of
modifying Matheson and Matheson’s Portfolio Matrix to be relevant to the Strategic
Development Planning and Experimentation Office. Figuring out what the SDPE Office
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considers “military value” and using those to find evaluation measures might prove
useful.
Additionally, after the suggested one year implementation of using the capability
development management tools from Section 4.2, the SDPE Office can reevaluate its
capability development management responsibilities and ask Academia for an updated
Literature Review or additional research for improving management. However, even
before the year is up, another Literature Review and Analysis is recommended due to this
research’s scope and limitations.
If additional time was available, the research team would attempt to contact the
various military organizations for a capability development point of contact for further
understanding of how each Service manages capability development and integration.
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